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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
Nobody seems to know for sure where Suzana Connor went. She had been 
arrested for felony DUI, and Big Dawg Bail Bonds posted her $50,000 bail. She had 
attended previous hearings, but didn't show as scheduled for a January 15, 2013 hearing, 
and so the hunt was on. Big Dawg followed leads to a Hare Krishna church in Los 
Angeles and then back to Boise, but ultimately, it seems, Connor may have found her 
way to India, which makes her prosecution somewhat more difficult. 
Shortly after the notice of bond forfeiture and arrest warrant issued, Big Dawg 
sought to have the forfeiture set aside and the bond exonerated. The district court set 
aside the forfeiture in part, exonerating $29,000 of the $50,000. Big Dawg complains 
here that the district court and Ada County sheriff fumbled the process and so the bond 
should be fully exonerated. 
II. Course of Proceedings and the Facts 
The arrest that led this case to this Court happened on June 3, 2012. (CR p. 98.) 
Connor bailed out on July 14 and was released. (CR p. 2.) When she failed to attend a 
hearing on January 15,2013, the district judge ordered her bail forfeited and that an arrest 
warrant issue. (CR p. 67.) The notice of forfeiture was mailed to the bail agent's 
insurance company on January 23, five business days after Connor's failure to appear, 
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which is what I.C. § 19-2915(2) requires. (CR p. 71.) The district judge signed the 
bench warrant the next day. 
Big Dawg filed a motion to set aside the bond forfeiture on January 31, claiming 
that the court failed to notify the bail agent (or insurance company; it's not clear from the 
motion) within five days of the failure to appear. (CR p. 72.) The district court 
conducted four hearings on the matter between February and July 2013. It issued a 
preliminary decision on April 22, 2013. In that decision, the court indicated it would 
defer deciding the motion until July 14, which concluded the 180-day period Big Dawg 
had to bring Connor in and have the bail reinstated. (CR p. 105.) The court issued a 
decision on August 26, 2013 setting aside the forfeiture to the tune of $29,000. (CR p. 
116.) 
Kevin Elliot owns Big Dawg. He received a phone call from Connor's mother-in-
law on January 12. She told him that "there were some things going on that were weird" 
that Elliot might want to look into. (Tr. p. 31.) He drove by the residence but 
"[e]verything seemed to be in order." (Tr. p. 34.) He "had eyes on them" and was 95 per 
cent confident he could have hauled Connor in on the 15th. (Tr. p. 20.) He decided not 
to bring her in, though, because he had heard that the mother-in-law wanted custody of 
Connor's children and didn't want to get in the middle of that. (Tr. pp. 33-34.) He also 
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didn't want to show up and check in because in his experience, when a bondsman does 
that, defendants "think something is up and they start ditching and diving." (Tr. p. 36.) 
Big Dawg got the notice of forfeiture from its insurance company on January 28. 
(CR p. 101). Elliot went out to Connor's mother's house that day and saw Connor's car, 
but not her. (Tr. pp. 38-39.) Even with the notice of forfeiture having been received, 
Elliot did not make contact because he did not want Connor to know he knew where her 
mother lived. (Tr. p. 38.) Even though the warrant had issued on January 24, Elliot made 
no effort to locate and arrest Connor between January 28 and 31. (Tr. p. 41.) Elliot 
started looking for Connor again on January 31. He went to Connor's mom's house, and 
the kids' schools, but it's unclear what exactly he found. 
Between then and August 2013, Elliot was on the trail. A Facebook page led 
Elliot to think Connor might have fled to a Hare Krishna community in southern 
California. (Tr. p. 86.) Elliot spent seven days in southern California looking for her, but 
ultimately learned that she had not, in fact, been there. (Tr. p. 87.) Back in the City of 
Trees, Elliot located Connor's ex-husband and bond co-signer, a Mr. Grindle. (Tr. p. 87.) 
There was no sign of Connor at Grindle's residence. (Tr. p. 88.) Elliot stuck a GPS 
device on Grindle's car and followed his moves to a Hare Krishna church in Boise. (Tr. 
pp. 88-89.) 
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At the Hare Krishna church in Boise, Elliot learned that Connor might have gone 
to India. (Tr. p. 89.) Elliot confronted Grindle about this and Grindle told Elliot that 
Connor was out of the country. (Tr. p. 89.) At the August 2013 hearing on the motion to 
set aside the forfeiture, Elliot said he was 98.9 per cent sure she was in India. (Tr. p. 90). 
To date, Connor's whereabouts are a mystery. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision whether to set aside a bond forfeiture and exonerate the bond is a 
matter committed to the trial court's discretion; the inquiry on appeal, therefore, is 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding whether to exonerate the bond. 1 
State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651, 655, 167 P.3d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 
2007). This evaluation tasks the Court with determining whether the district court (a) 
correctly perceived the matter as discretionary; (b) acted within the "outer boundaries" of 
that discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
available to it; and (c) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Two Jinn, 
Inc., 151 Idaho 725, 728,264 P.3d 66,69 (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 
832,243 P.3d 642, 648 (2010)). 
I There are some circumstances when exoneration of bail isn't a discretionary calL Idaho Code § 
19-2922 directs that a court "shall order the bail exonerated" if anyone of six events listed there 
occurs. Those six events aren't applicable here. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION By 
SETTING ASIDE THE BOND FORFEITURE AND 
EXONERATING $29,000 OF THE $50,000 BOND BECAUSE IT 
THOROUGHLY EXAMINED THE FACTS AND BIG DAWG HAS 
FAILED To DEMONSTRATE LEGAL ERROR IN THE COURT'S 
ApPLICATION OF THE ApPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES TO 
THOSE FACTS. 
After Big Dawg filed its motion to set aside the bond forfeiture, the district court 
conducted four evidentiary hearings and produced two written decisions evaluating the 
facts against the factors listed in Idaho Crim. R. 46(h) dealing with setting aside 
forfeitures. The district court explained how it weighed all the relevant facts and arrived 
at the decision to exonerate $29,000 of the $50,000 bond. On appeal, Big Dawg floats a 
breach-of-contract theory it says should apply to the remedy in lieu of the statutes and 
rules covering bond exoneration. There is, though, no basis to apply contract principles 
where there is a clear statutory and rule-based scheme for addressing bond exoneration. 
Big Dawg also barks at the district court's evaluation of the facts against the Rule 46 
factors. This complaint, however, amounts to a simple disagreement with the district 
court's ultimate result, and the Court should reject the invitation to depart from the 
standard by which these discretionary decisions are reviewed. It is with this latter 
agreement we shall begin. 
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I. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Considering the Rule 46(h) 
Factors and Other Facts 
The plain words of the statute and rule governing motions to set aside bond 
forfeitures reflect a grant of broad discretion to the trial courts. Idaho Code § 19-2917 
states that the court that ordered forfeiture may set the forfeiture order aside "in whole or 
in part, upon such conditions as the court may impose, as provided by rules adopted by 
the supreme court, if it appears that justice so requires." Idaho Crim. R. 46(h) directs trial 
courts to consider "all relevant factors," and lists nine non-mandatory and non-exclusive 
factors. Big Dawg posits that the district court did not give due weight to the Rule 46(h) 
factors, but as we will see, the district court evaluated them all, carefully weighed the 
facts, and arrived at a reasoned decision. 
Big Dawg's arguments may be disposed of as follows: 
A. The Bail Agent's Efforts in Locating and Apprehending the 
Defendant-Idaho Crim. R. 46(h)(1)(B) 
Big Dawg first argues that the district court didn't properly weigh Big Dawg's 
attempts to apprehend the absconder. Appellant's Br. 15-16; see Idaho Crim. R. 
46(h)(l)(B). Actually, the district court cited the "great lengths" Big Dawg went to in an 
attempt to locate Connor. The court noted Big Dawg cooperated with law enforcement 
and took steps to find her. (CR p. 113.) Big Dawg faults the district court for not 
weighing the delay between the issuance of the warrant and the Ada County Sheriff 
6 
receiving it. Appellant's Br. 16. But the court wrote that the delay was a mitigating 
factor, though not conclusive, and explained the factors that were relevant to that 
determination: Big Dawg decided not to revoke the bond despite information that Conner 
might abscond. Big Dawg's witness, Elliot, said this was because he didn't want to 
confront her or get in the middle of a perceived custody battle. As the prosecution and 
the district court observed, this was a decision made by Big Dawg and isn't the State's 
fault. (CRpp. 115-16.) 
Big Dawg complains about the time between Connor's non-appearance and the 
issuance of the notice of forfeiture and the bench warrant. The significance of this is 
overblown. Notice of the forfeiture must be mailed to the bail company within five 
business days of the order of forfeiture. I.e. § 19-2915(2). The order was signed and 
mailed on January 23. The district court ordered that bail be forfeited at the January 15 
hearing. Even if the five-business-day period began running on January 15, the notice 
was still timely mailed. As the district court pointed out, the 15th was a Tuesday and the 
following Monday was a state holiday. I.e. § 73-108. January 23 was the following 
Wednesday, precisely five business days after the 15th. So the five-day requirement was 
met. 
. The warrant's timing does not justify full exoneration. There is no requirement 
that the warrant be transmitted to the bail agent. And unlike the notice of forfeiture, 
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which must be mailed to the bail agent within five days, the failure of which results in a 
mandatory exoneration, see I.e. § 19-2922(2), there is no requirement that if the warrant 
doesn't issue within a prescribed period the bail must be exonerated. This factor is 
therefore discretionary. 
Big Dawg argues that since the warrant didn't issue on the 15th, it lost its chance 
to find Conner and haul her in. But here are some facts that are relevant to any 
consideration of the timing of the warrant's issuance: Big Dawg didn't attend the January 
15 hearing or call Connor or do anything else on the 15th to find out whether she showed 
up. Such measures might be more inconvenient, but may have averted the problem. 
Big Dawg actually received the notice of forfeiture from its insurance company on 
January 28. The court mailed the notice within five business days to the entity to which it 
was required to mail the notice. The statute creates a built-in five-day period between the 
failure-to-appear and when notice of the forfeiture has to be mailed. Notice would have 
arrived at a Boise address likely no sooner than the 24th, which is when the warrant 
issued and was therefore a matter of public record. 
And we know that Elliot drove by Connor's mother's residence on the 28th and 
spotted Connor's car (but made no other attempts to nab her that day). So by Elliot's 
judgment, Connor had not fled Boise as of the 28th. Instead of apprehending her, even 
knowing she had failed to appear, Big Dawg did nothing. By this time, the warrant had 
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been active for four days. We know, too, that Big Dawg made no effort between January 
28 and 31 to locate Connor. Elliot did check the Idaho Supreme Court's Repository Web 
site, which didn't show an active warrant until the 31st. But he didn't call the court. 
Elliot testified that had he brought Connor in after forfeiture but before a warrant 
issues, he would have been arrested for kidnapping, since the bail agent loses its right to 
arrest the defendant once forfeiture happens. Big Dawg and the local prosecutor agreed 
that the Ada County Sheriff has a policy that once forfeiture occurs, a bail agent cannot 
arrest a person unless there is an active warrant. Idaho Code § 19-2913 provides that "[a]t 
any time before forfeiture of bail, a surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may 
surrender the defendant to the sheriff," and if that happens, "the sheriff shall accept and 
incarcerate the defendant in lieu of the bail originally set by the court." I.C. § 19-2913(1) 
(emphasis supplied). However, Idaho Code § 19-2914 states that "[a]t any time before 
the exoneration of bail, the surety insurance company or its bail agent ... may empower 
any person of suitable age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the 
state by signing an affidavit extending such authority in a form approved by the supreme 
court." (Emphasis supplied.) So nothing should have stopped Elliot from acting 
pursuant to § 19-2914 after the bond was forfeited and before exoneration and arresting 
Connor. 
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Big Dawg de-emphasizes the fact that the warrant issued on January 24-four 
days before Elliot found Connor's car at her mother's place. The record demonstrates 
that after the 15th, Elliot made no efforts to contact the court to inquire about the 
situation, even though it was a matter of public record that Connor had failed to appear 
and even though Big Dawg retained the authority to arrest Connor. That the warrant 
didn't find its way onto the Repository Web site or to the Sheriffs office doesn't mean 
Big Dawg didn't have other means to find out if there was an active warrant. For 
example: Had Big Dawg followed up on the 15th, it would have then learned that their 
customer was a no-show. As bail agents, Big Dawg's people would have then known 
that bond had been forfeited and that a warrant would be issuing. Big Dawg could have 
kept tabs on her and checked with the district court, rather than the perhaps more 
convenient Web sites of the Repository and Ada County Sheriff, to find the status of the 
warrant. When the warrant issued, Big Dawg could have gotten a copy, arrested the 
defendant, and presented it to the Sheriff when it delivered Connor. 
The district court also noted that Big Dawg's decision not to apprehend Connor 
stemmed from some Department of Insurance regulation Elliot said limited when he 
could revoke the bond. Those regulations weren't cited specifically anywhere in the 
record (or in Big Dawg's brief to this Court), and indeed, the Department of Insurance 
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rules, effective since 2011 (and appended to this brief), do not say anything about the 
conditions under which a bail agent may revoke bond. 
B. Cost, Inconvenience, and Prejudice to the State-Idaho Crim. R. 
46(h)(1)(C) 
The district court wrote that the only cost, inconvenience, and prejudice to the 
State was the "obvious": The State had to defend the motion to set aside the forfeiture 
and law enforcement spent time and effort to locate Connor. (CR p. 113.) The 
inconvenience to the State is also the fact that the defendant absconded to probably India, 
and the State is prejudiced because it cannot likely prosecute her for a felony DUI so long 
as she is an ocean and a continent away. 
Big Dawg says, without much explanation or any authority, that this should be 
weighed against the State. But its argument on this point is a mere invitation to simply 
arrive at a different result than the district court. The inquiry isn't whether one tribunal 
would have reached a different result-the inquiry is whether the court abused its 
discretion. 
C. Intangible costs-Idaho Crim. R. 46(h)(1)(D) 
The district court "dec1ine[ d] to speculate" on the intangible costs because no 
party introduced evidenced on what they might be. (CR p. 114.) Big Dawg nevertheless 
contends that the intangible costs are a lack of faith in the system .... " Appellant's Br. 
p. 16. The intangible costs of Big Dawg's customer absconding to India are that the 
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people of Idaho cannot bring Connor to justice because Big Dawg's customer is likely in 
India. Connor was released because Big Dawg guaranteed her presence for court with a 
$50,000 bond. The State timely notified the bail agent's insurance company and Big 
Dawg always had the opportunity to arrest Connor, and so if anything, Big Dawg's lack-
of-faith-in-the-system argument is unfounded. 
D. The Public's Interest in Ensuring the Defendant's Presence - Idaho 
Crim. R. 46(h)(1)(E) 
The court gave the public interest less weight than it might in say, a case involving 
a serial rapist or pedophile. (CR p. 114.) Nevertheless, there is certainly a significant 
public interest in bringing those charged with felony DUI to justice. As Big Dawg 
concedes, "[t]he public has a profound and vested interest in making sure that a defendant 
who regularly drives while intoxicated is brought to court." Appellant's Br. p. 16. 
Exactly: Fully exonerating the bond in this case defeats the public interest because it tells 
defendants and bail agents that felony DUIs are not that important. 
E. Mitigating Factors-Idaho Crim. R. 46(h)(1)(F) 
The district court noted these mitigating factors: (l) the bail agent's efforts to 
locate Connor; (2) the delay in the actual issuance of the warrant; and (3) the Ada County 
Sheriffs policy of not accepting a defendant after bail is forfeited. (CR p. 15.) Again, 
Big Dawg simply disagrees with the district court's resolution ofthese issues. It points to 
no facts the district court missed and offers no legal authority to displace the district 
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court's decision. This Court should decline Big Dawg's invitation to the Court to 
substitute its judgment for the trial court's. 
F. Deterrence-Idaho Crim. R. 46(h)(1)(1) 
As the district court pointed out, deterrence weighed against exoneration. (CR p. 
115.) If those guaranteeing the presence of a person are entitled to full exoneration of the 
bail as Big Dawg seeks here, bail will lose its deterrence factor because, as the district 
court reasonably observed, "[i]t will send a message to bonding companies that there is 
less need to carefully screen and monitor those for whom bond is posted." (CR p. 115.) 
* * * 
After reviewing all the relevant facts, the district court exonerated the bond to well 
more than half of the original amount. This figure included amounts Elliot testified were 
direct costs in Big Dawg's hunt for Connor. It reflected the district court's judgment that 
there were things both the State and Big Dawg could have done differently. Under the 
abuse-of-discretion standard, mere disagreements by a party with the trial court's 
reasoned application of the relevant principles of law to the relevant facts in the record do 
not justify reversal. Whether a reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion, an 
appellate court's task in reviewing discretionary decisions by the trial courts is not to re-
weigh all the evidence and substitute its judgment. That is what Big Dawg asks this 
Court to do on appeal, and the Court should reject the request. 
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II. The Court Should Reject Big Dawg's Call to Ignore the Statutes and Rules 
Governing Motions to Set Aside Bond Forfeitures in Favor of Common-Law 
Contract Rules 
Big Dawg argues that the warrant was unjustifiably delayed, and so the State 
breached its contract bet\:veen Big Dawg and the State. Appellant's Br. pp. 10-11. 
Existing law, Big Dawg continues, is written into that contract. "[D]ue to the delay, Big 
Dawg could not perfonn [its] end of the contract." But rather than following the statutory 
and rule-based provisions governing motions to set aside bond forfeitures, Big Dawg 
contends the Court should afford it common-law contract remedies. Appellant's Br. p. 
11. 
Big Dawg is right that existing law is part of the contract. Two Jinn, 151 Idaho at 
728, 264 P.3d at 69. But its conclusion is exactly backwards. While contract principles 
may apply to the parties' perfonnance of the bail agreement, I.C. § 19-2917 and Idaho 
Crim. R. 46 unmistakably supply the manner in which courts must evaluate motions to 
set aside bond forfeitures. Kirkland v. Blaine County Med. Ctr., l34 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d 
1115 (2000) (Legislature has authority to limit remedies for a cause of action). Big Dawg 
has provided no authority or reason for the Court to ignore the established rules 
governing motions to set aside bond forfeitures. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment should be affinned. 
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18.01.04 - RULES PERTAINING TO BAIL AGENTS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
This rule is promulgated pursuant to the authority vested in the director under Sections 41-211 and 41-1037 through 
41-1045, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
01. Title. This rule shall be cited in full as Idaho Department of Insurance Rule IDAPA 18.01.04, 
"Rules Pertaining to Bail Agents." (4-7-11) 
02. Scope. The provisions of this rule shall apply to all bail agents, as defined by Section 41-1038, 
Idaho Code. This rule is supplementary to other rules and laws regulating insurance producers, and all other rules of 
the department and provisions of title 41, Idaho Code, applicable to insurance producers shall also apply to bail 
agents. (4-7 -11) 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRETATIONS. 
In accordance with Section 67-5201 (l9)(b)(iv), Idaho Code, this agency may have written statements which pertain 
to the interpretation of the rules of this chapter, or to the documentation of compliance with the rules of this chapter. 
These documents will bc available for public inspection and copying at cost in the main office and each regional or 
district office of this agency. (4-7 -11) 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
All administrative appeals shall be governed by Title 4 I, Chapter 2, Idaho Code, the Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act, Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho Code, and IDAPA 04.11.01, "Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure of the 
Attorney General - General provisions." (4-7-11) 
004. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
There are no documents incorporated by reference. (4-7-11) 
005. OFFICE -- OFFICE HOURS -- MAILING ADDRESS, STREET ADDRESS AND WEB ADDRESS. 
01. Office Hours. The Department ofInsurance is open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. except Saturday, Sunday 
and legal holidays. (4-7 -11) 
02. Mailing Address. The department's mailing address is: Idaho Department ofInsurance, P.O. Box 




Street Address. The principal place of business is 700 West State Street, 3rd Floor, Boise, ID 
(4-7-1I ) 
Web Site Address. The department's website is http://www.doi.idaho.gov. (4-7-11) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS COMPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act, Title 9, Chapter 
3, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
007. -- 011. (RESERVED). 
012. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. 
01. Notice of Changes Required. A bail agent licensed pursuant to Section 4 I -I 039, Idaho Code, shall 
inllTIediately notifY the Department of Insurance in writing of any the following: (4-7 -11) 
Section 000 Page 2 
IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Department of Insurance 
IDAPA 18.01.04 
Rules Pertaining to Bail Agents 
a. Change of bail agent's name; (4-7-11) 
b. Change of bail agent's current business address; (4-7-11) 







Change of name or address of any surety insurance company for which the bail agent has an active 
(4-7-11) 
Cancellation by a surety insurance company of a bail agent's authority to write bonds for that 
(4-7-11) 
Any new affiliation with a bail bond agency; 
Cancellation of a bail agent's affiliation with a bail agency; 
(4-7-11 ) 
(4-7-11) 
02. Notice of Legal Proceedings Required. A bail agent shall provide immediate written notice to the 
Department of Insurance of the filing of any criminal charges against the bail agent. In addition to the foregoing, a 
bail agent shall provide immediate written notice to the Department of Insurance of any material change in 
circumstances that would require a different answer than previously provided by the bail agent on the background 
information section of the Uniform Application for Individual Insurance Producer LicenselRegistration. Upon 
request by the department, the bail agent shall provide copies of all relevant legal documents relating to the matter 
and any additional relevant information requested. (4-7 -11) 
013. CRIMINAL HISTORY CHECKS. 
01. Criminal History Check Required. Alllieensed bail agents must obtain a criminal history records 
check in connection with the renewal of a bail agent's license and shall bear all costs associated with the records 
check. (4-7-11) 
02. Grounds for Immediate Suspension. For the purpose of determining whether grounds for 
immediate suspension of a bail agent's license exist under Section 41-1039(4), Idaho Code, a withheld judgment or a 
plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as a conviction or guilty plea. (4-7-11) 
014. STACKING OF BONDS PROHIBITED. 
A bail agent may submit only one (1) power of attorney with each bail bond submitted to any Idaho court. The face 
value or face amount of the power shall be equal to or greater than the amount of the bailor bond set by the court in 
the case for which the bond and power are being submitted. A bail agent shall not attempt to "stack" bonds or powers 
by SUbmitting more than one (1) power of attorney for any single bond. (4-7-11) 
015. ~OTIFICATION TO SURETY OF FORFEITURE. 
A bail agent shall notify the surety insurance company of any forfeiture, as defined in Section 19-2905, Idaho Code, 
within ten (10) days of receiving the notice from the court. (4-7-11) 
016. ALLOWABLE BAIL AGENT CHARGES AND FEES. 
01. Charges for Bail Transaction. A bail agent shall not directly or indirectly impose or seek to 
impose any fees or charges except for those permitted under Section 41-1042, Idaho Code, as a part of any 
application, issuance, effectuation or continuation of a bail bond. (4-7-11) 
02. Charges for Additional Services. Charges and fees outside the scope of Section 41-1042, Idaho 
Code, such as charges for returning a defendant to custody after a breach of the bail bond contract, must be negotiated 
separately after the bail bond has been effectuated. Negotiations for additional charges shall not be entered into as a 
part of the application, issuance and effectuation of a bail bond and shall not be a condition of or requirement for 
entering into or continuing a bail bond contract. Any fees or charges that are negotiated separately shall be reasonable 
in relation to the expenses or services for which the fee or charge is imposed and must be accompanied by a statement 
that clearly explains that any agreement to pay fees or charges is not a requirement or condition to the validity of the 
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(4-7-11) 
03. Collateral. Except as provided in Section 017.03 of this rule, collateral accepted in connection with 
the bail bond transaction shall be used solely for reimbursement of penal amounts paid to the courts in the case of 
forfeiture of the bail bond. (4-7 -11) 
017. BAIL AGENT FINANCING OF BAIL BOND PREMIUMS. 
01. Written Agreement Required. No credit may be extended by any bail agent or surety insurance 
company for the payment of any bail bond premium without entering into a written agreement. The written 
agreement for the extension of credit to finance premium must contain at a minimum the following: (4-7-11) 
a. The names of the parties to the credit agreement; (4-7-11) 
b. The amount of premium financed; (4-7-11) 
c. The per annum rate of interest; (4-7-11) 
d. The scheduled premium payment dates; and (4-7-11) 
e. Signatures and dates of signatures of all parties to the credit agreement. (4-7-11) 
02. Early Surrender for Failure to Pay. If failure to pay premiums due under a credit arrangement 
may result in the early surrender of the defendant, that fact must be clearly set forth in the written credit agreement. 
Early surrender for failure to make premium or interest payments when due must be handled in accordance with 
Section 41-1044, Idaho Code, and neither the bail agent nor the surety shall be entitled to seek recovery of any 
amounts unpaid as of the date of surrender. (4-7 -11) 
03. Collateral for Credit Agreement. If the credit agreement is to be collateralized, the collateral 
must not be excessive in relation to the amount of premium financed, must be separate and apart from any collateral 
used in the bail bond transaction, must be described in the credit agreement or in an attachment to the agreement, and 
must be handled in accordance with Section 41-1043, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
018. PAYMENT OF FORFEITURE. 
It is a violation of Section 41-1329(6), Idaho Code, for a bail surety to intentionally, or with such frequency as to 
indicate a general business practice, fail to pay a claim for forfeiture after liability for payment has become 
reasonably clear. Liability for payment upon forfeiture is reasonably clear when a defendant has not appeared or has 
not been brought before the court within one hundred eighty 180 days after the entry of the order of forfeiture, or a 
motion to set aside the forfeiture, in whole or in part, has not been filed with the court within five (5) business days 
after the expiration of the one hundred eighty (180) day period following the order offorfeiture pursuant to the Idaho 
Bail Act. (4-7-11) 
019. SEVER4.BlLITY. 
If any provision of this Rule is for any reason held to be invalid, the remainder of the Rule shall not be affected 
thereby. (4-7-11) 
020. -- 999. (RESERVED) 
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